A comparison of different finite fields for elliptic curve cryptosystems  by Smart, N.P.
PERGAMON 
An Intemational Joumal 
computers & 
mathematics 
with appllcsUons 
Computers and Mathematics with Applications 42 (2001) 91-100 
www.elsevier.nl/locate/camwa 
A Comparison of Different 
Finite Fields for 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems 
N. P. SMART 
Computer Science Department 
University of Bristol 
Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB, UK 
nigel©cs, bris. ac. uk 
(Received June 2000; revised and accepted November 2000) 
Abst rac t - -We xamine the relative fficiency of four methods for finite field representation in the 
context of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We conclude that a set of fields called the optimized 
extension fields (OEFs) give greater performance, ven when used with a2fine coordinates, when 
compared against he type of fields recommended in the emerging ECC standards. Although this 
performance advantage is only marginal, and hence, there is probably no need to change the current 
standards to allow OEF fields in standards compliant implementations. © 2001 Elsevier Science 
Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The efficient implementation f arithmetic in finite fields is crucial for the high performance of 
various cryptographic algorithms, such as those based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm 
problem in finite fields, elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves. In all of these schemes, the efficiency 
of the underlying finite field operations i the dominant performance constraint, any effort spent 
optimising the field operations i  well spent. This has led a number of special choices of field to 
be used, each with its own performance characteristics. Due to different engineering constraints 
such as processor type, memory requirements, etc., there is no correct answer to the question: 
which field should one use? 
In this paper, we look in more detail at the choice of finite fields in the case of elliptic curve 
based systems. It is important, when comparing one parameter choice against another, that we 
use real world parameter choices and we look not only at the performance of the underlying field 
arithmetic but also at the performance of the overall cryptographic protocols. This is important 
since some cryptographic algorithms do not make use of general arithmetic but only require 
careful optimisation of crucial parts. This is particularly true of modular exponentiation based 
systems where it makes more sense to spend a lot of time optimising the squaring operation 
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as opposed to the general multiplication operation. A similar situation holds for elliptic curves, 
where one needs to optimise the point doubling operation more than the general point addition 
operation. 
In this paper, we will concentrate on the choice of finite field and not consider the use of 
special curves, such as the so-called Koblitz curves, which can provide performance advantages. 
Hence, our conclusions will not be affected by security considerations a long as the overwhelming 
majority of curves over the given fields are considered to be secure. 
It is also important o compare like for like, for example if one system uses machine code 
for the main arithmetics whilst the one being compared against uses no machine code then the 
comparison is not really fair. In addition, one should only compare algorithms using a single 
computer. Even comparisons on almost identical processors can lead to different conclusions. 
For example, in fields of characteristic two arithmetic is often implemented via lookup tables, 
hence, algorithms will behave differently on two processors which are identical bar the fact that 
one has a faster access time for its cache. Also, comparing two systems which are programmed 
by different people one could be comparing programming ability rather than actual performance. 
Often these considerations are ignored, since complexity theory tells us that implementation 
details should not matter and that it is the complexity of the algorithm itself which should 
determine the relative merits. But complexity arguments only hold in the limit, which may 
not be applicable at the problem size under consideration. For example, when multiplying two 
integers, complexity theory tells us that Fourier transform techniques or Karatsuba multiplication 
will work faster than school book multiplication, but when multiplying 200 bit numbers it is often 
far more efficient in practice to use a school book multiplication algorithm. 
Various other authors have compared implementation details for elliptic curve systems, but we 
would contend that such comparisons are to be taken with a pinch of salt. For example Bailey 
and Paar [1] compare their OEF based elliptic curve implementation against other peoples im- 
plementations of characteristic two fields of composite degrees. This is bad practice for a number 
of reasons. First, composite fields of characteristic two are not recommended for use in crypto- 
graphic standards (a view which has been reinforced by recent work in [2]). Second, the authors 
of [1] have a reason to prefer OEF fields since they are putting them forward as a replacement for 
standard implementations, although in our comparison we give independent verification of their 
conclusion that OEF fields offer significant advantages. Third, the comparison was performed 
on 64 bit architectures, which although these are now common in high end workstations, are not 
likely to be common in the small devices which are the target for elliptic curve based systems. 
Our comparison on a 32 bit R/SC system is likely to be more indicative since such processors, 
like the StrongArm, are likely to be used in a number of such devices in the coming years. A 
comparison of various elliptic curve algorithms on an 8 bit smartcard without coprocessor was 
given in [3], although this paper concentrated mainly on OEF fields. For those interested in 
constrained environments we recommend that the current paper is read in conjunction with [3]. 
In another comparison, in [4] the authors give a comparison between even characteristic fields 
and odd characteristic fields, the later being implemented using Barrett reduction. This is slightly 
flawed since standards compliant elliptic curve systems in odd characteristic are more likely to 
be implemented over fields defined by a Generalised Mersenne prime which provide different 
performance characteristics than general primes. 
The main reason for our interest was to compare the new idea of OEF fields with the fields 
defined by GM-primes which occur in the standards documents. Hence, all our implementations 
were coded from scratch and shared many core subprocedures. A similar length of time was 
spent optimising each implementation, and so, the relative differences in performance should be 
indicative of completely optimised implementations. Although the resulting comparisons are not 
completely scientific, we do hope that they are on a better foundation than previous ones. Hence, 
hopefully they can be used to make further commercial considerations as to which fields are to 
be preferred. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we outline the rough methodology we used to compare the running times of the 
various field choices. This is done to enable others to compare their own timings against ours, or 
our design decisions with their own. 
First, we decided to compare on two processor types, one a RISC processor and one a CISC 
processor. These were an Ultra Sparc IIi running at 440 Mhz with the Solaris operating system, 
the other was a Pentium Pro running at 166 Mhz with the Linux operating system. Although 
both processors upport a limited amount of special purpose 64 bit registers, for example the 
MMX instructions on the Pentium can use 64 bit data, we decided our implementation should 
concentrate on the 32 bit core. This decision was also done to aid interoperability, since it is 
easier to write portable C÷+ code which uses 32 bit data rather than 64 bit data. In addition, 
since elliptic curves are more likely to be used in constrained environments, it is more likely that 
they will be implemented on 32 bit processors rather than 64 bit processors. 
The programming language used was C++ and the compiler was the GNU g÷+ compiler, 
version 2.95.1. The GNU compiler enables a quite powerful inline assembly option. We decided 
to only implement hree small routines in assembler, mainly adding functionality present on 
most modern processors to the C+÷ language. These three pieces of assembler implemented the 
following (inlined) functions, the entities on the left denote the output which depends on the 
input on the right, 
(C, a) --a+b+c 
(c, a) =a-b- c 
(h, 1)--a*b+t+c 
where c denotes a one bit value and (h, l) denotes the 64 bit quantity h232 ÷ I. The multiplication 
used may seem a little strange at first, but it turns out to be very useful. Since we only imple- 
mented a small amount in assembler our code was highly portable, on the other hand the code 
could be made considerably more efficient using greater use of assembler. 
The code was implemented using as much common shared code between the various field 
representations a possible, hence, the comparison would be of the fields and not the different 
implementations of other nonimportant functions. 
The code was also designed to work with any number of field sizes, hence, although special 
tricks were used for each field type these were coded in as general a way as possible. One could 
argue that this is unlikely to be the case in real life, since one may wish to hardwire a field into 
a particular application. This would result in even greater efficiency gains, since the exact field 
would be decided at compile time. However, one could also argue that some applications would 
need to keep the size of field open until run time, since that way one maintains greater chances of 
being interoperable with other applications. Since we tried to keep the code general and did not 
use a great deal of machine code this meant aggressive optimisations such as software pipelining 
would only be available via the compiler's own optimisation routines. 
Using C÷÷ also allowed us to direct a number of 'optimisation hints' to the  compiler, by 
for example hinting as to when a function should be inlined or when a passed argument should 
be considered a constant for the function call. However, it is widely believed that object code 
produced from C source is more efficient than that produced from C÷÷ source. We did not 
consider this a problem since we were mainly interested in the relative performance of the various 
arithmetics. 
To avoid the influence of programming ability on the performance of different field types, all 
code was implemented from scratch by the author with no routines 'borrowed' from existing 
pieces of software. 
We end this section by stressing that the absolute run times we give below could clearly be 
improved. However, we believe the relative run times should be indicative of what should hold 
in any reasonable implementation. 
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3. THE CHOICES FOR F IELDS 
Currently, there are a number of field choices for elliptic curve systems that are mentioned in 
the literature. These can be divided into two classes. 
3.1 .  P r ime F ie lds  
Fields of large prime characteristic, Fp, are very popular since they can be efficiently imple- 
mented using techniques borrowed from other finite field based cryptographic systems uch as 
DSA and RSA. However, using standard modular arithmetic is not very efficient since multi- 
precision remaindering operations are very expensive. Hence, when used in elliptic curve systems 
there are various choices that are often made. 
Genera l  P r imes  
For general primes the most efficient implementation technique is almost always to use Mont- 
gomery arithmetic, [5]. Although the authors of [4] use Barrett reduction, the timing difference 
between Montgomery arithmetic and Barrett reduction is usually negligible. 
Montgomery arithmetic uses a special representation to perform efficient arithmetic, the divi- 
sion and remaindering essentially being performed by bit, or word, shifting. We do not cover this 
arithmetic here since it is covered in a number of text books, e.g., [6,7]. In [8] various ways of 
implementing Montgomery arithmetic are described. We tried both the FIOS and CIOS methods 
and decided that in our situation the FIOS method gave the greatest efficiency. 
Field inversion was performed using a standard modification of the binary extended Euclidean 
algorithm for Montgomery arithmetic. 
Genera l ized Mersenne Pr imes  
Certain primes are highly suited for efficient reduction techniques, the most simple form of 
such primes being the Mersenne primes, which are primes of the form p -- 2 k - 1. However, the 
number of Mersenne primes of the correct size for cryptography is limited. This has led a number 
of authors to propose generalisations on the Mersenne primes. 
Crandall [9] proposed the use of primes of the form p = 2 k - c where c is a small integer, which 
is usually chosen to fit into a single word. Primes of the form p --- 2 k + c for a small value of c 
(in comparison to 2 k) are often called pseudo-Mersenne primes. 
In another direction, Solinas [10] introduced the concept of generalized Mersenne primes (GM- 
primes) which are primes of the form 
p = ,f (2k),  
where f is a polynomial of small degree and weight and k is a multiple of the computer word 
size. 
The use of GM-primes has become popular due to the adoption of these primes .in the recom- 
mend curves in standards from such bodies as ANSI [11], NIST [12], SECG [13], and WAP [14]. 
As an example we take the following example from Solinas' paper 
f ( t )  = t 3 - t - 1. 
Then we obtain the 192 bit prime 
p ----- 2192 -- 264 -- 1 = f (264).  
Reducing the result of a multiprecision multiplication is then a simple matter: after performing 
the multiprecision multiplication (via school book methods) of two 192 bit integers we obtain a 
number of the form 
N = (AsIIA411A31IA211A~IIAo), 
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where Ai is a 64 bit integer. The value of N modulo p can then be computed with three additions 
modulo p, 
N-T+SI+S2+S3 (mod p), 
where 
T = (A2] IA I l IAo) ,  S 1 = (011A311A3), 
$2 = (A4[tAaII0), $3 = (As I IAs I IA~) .  
Inversion was again performed using a variant of the binary extended Euclidean algorithm. 
3.2. Nonpr ime F ie lds 
Again there are a number of choices here for the fields Fq with q = pn.  These are usually 
implemented via a polynomial basis where 
Fq - Fp[z]  
f(z) 
and f (x )  is an irreducible polynomial of degree n over Fp. 
Character i s t i c  Two 
In this case, due to work described in [2], we need to choose n to be prime. One chooses f (x )  
to be a trinomial or pentanomial for efficiency. In other words, we choose either 
y(z )  = x ~ + z k + 1 
or 
f (x )  = x n + x k + x I + x m + 1. 
These have been a popular choice in standards bodies and for implementors due to the advantages 
that they offer in hardware and on some RISC processors. The literature on these is quite 
extensive so we just refer the reader to [6] or [15] for more mathematical details. Normal bases 
can be used, but these are more usual when considering hardware implementations of fields in 
characteristic two, hence, we shall not consider normal bases further here. 
To implement characteristic two arithmetic a 256 × 256 look up table was computed which gave 
the 16 bit result of multiplying two 8 bit quantities, when one considered the integers representing 
a binary polynomial. Using this look up table, an inlined function was created to multiply two 
32 bit quantities and return a 64 bit result. Then the multiplication of two n bit polynomials was 
reduced to various calls of the 32 bit multiplication routines using Karatsuba style techniques. 
Squaring an n bit polynomial is particularly easy since there are no 'cross terms' in characteristic 
two. Hence, all that one needs to do is divide the n bit input into 8 bit chunks and then compute 
the 16 bit square using the previously mentioned lookup table. 
After having squared an n bit polynomial, or multiplied two n bit polynomials, we obtain a 
2n bit result. This needs to be reduced to an n bit final answer by taking the remainder on 
division by f .  This is done using a word-oriented version of [6, Algorithm II.9]. 
Field inversion was performed using a variant of the binary Euclidean algorithm. 
Opt imized  Extens ion  F ie lds 
These fields have been proposed by Bailey and Paar in [1,16]. They appear to offer a number 
of advantages which we shall outline below. An optimized extension field (OEF) is one of the 
form 
• p -- 2 k :t: c is a pseudo-Mersenne prime with log 2 c _< k /2  and such that p fits into a 
computer word, 
• f (x )  = x "~ - w is irreducible. 
For efficiency reasons it is often sensible to insist that w -- 2. 
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In OEF fields, addition of elements in Fq is relatively simple and can be accomplished without 
carries propagating, since elements of Fq are implemented as polynomials modulo f (x ) .  Multi- 
plication is also very simple since reduction of a polynomial modulo f (x )  is particular simple. 
Multiplication can also be simplified using Karatsuba multiplication, which provides a perfor- 
mance advantage for polynomial multiplication for very small degree polynomials. 
Finally, inversion is particularly easy in OEF fields since one can use a technique due to Itoh and 
Tsujii [17] combined with an efficient method to compute the action of the Frobenius mapping, 
see [16] for more details on this. 
It should be noted that the technique of Weil descent which is described in [2] could be applied 
to curves defined over OEFs, since n is typically small. However, the resulting curve does not seem 
to have the nice properties that one observes in the even characteristic case. This is because the 
function field extensions are not Artin-Schreier in nature. Hence, to the best current knowledge 
there are no security concerns with using OEFs. However, this could change given the rapid 
progress made in studying the EC-DLP in recent years. 
As stated in the introduction, there has been no comprehensive comparison of the above choices 
of finite fields in the literature. Since the use of Montgomery arithmetic and even characteristic 
finite fields are quite standard [4] these are not the most interesting cases. 
However, the comparison of OEFs against GM-prime fields has not to our knowledge been 
carried out. But this is the most important comparison to make, since GM-prime fields are those 
which are being used by various standards bodies, e.g., ANSI, NIST, and SECG. 
4. F IELD OPERATIONS 
The fields we used for comparison where the following. 
K1 = Fp, where p = 2192 - 264 - 1. This was used for the GM-prime implementation and the 
Montgomery implementation. 
K~. = Fp,, = F,,[z]/(z 6 - 2), where p = 231 - 19. This was used for the OEF implementation. 
= F,o --F;izi/(z191 +:  + 1). 
Notice that roughly the same bitlength was used for all fields, namely 192 and 186. Tables 1 
and 2 describe the timings we obtained for our two different processors. 
Table 1. Field operation timings on the Sparc. 
Field Type Addition Multiplication Square Inversion I /M 
Montgomery 0.72 jz s 6.06 # s 6.04 ms 0.16 ms 26.40 
GM-prime 0.76 ~s 4.56~s 4.44 ms 0.16ms 35.09 
OEF 0.84 ~ s 4.08 # s 4.04 ms 0.02 ms 4.90 
F2191 0.16~us 11.20#s 1.36 ms 0.14ms 12.50 
Table 2. Field operation timings on the Pentium. 
Field Type Addition Multiplication Square Inversion I /M 
Montgomery 2.25 ~ s 11.40 ~ s 11.36 ms 0.60 ms 52.63 
GM-prime 2.25 ]z s 11.40 ~ s 11.24 ms 0.58 ms 50.88 
OEF 1.72/~s 9.36/~ s 8.Sms 0.08 ms 8.54 
F21~1 0.40/~s 20.88#s 5.40ms 0.42 ms 20.11 
Notice that the even characteristic case appears to be the worst since multiplication is almost 
twice as slow as the next slowest field type, namely the Montgomery representation. However, 
this does not translate into a 100% increase in the required CPU time for the final cryptographic 
operation since for fields of even characteristic the squaring operation comes almost for free. In 
addition, elliptic curve point doubling formulae in characteristic two are simpler than those in 
the odd characteristic case. 
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The use of multiplication is slightly faster for the OEF field compared to the GM-prime field. 
But the most striking improvement is in the time required to perform an inversion in the field. 
As we shall comment later, this leads to important decisions on how one actually implements an 
elliptic curve cryptographic system. It is important o look at the ratio, r = I /M,  of the time 
needed to perform an inversion, I, to the time to compute a multiplication, M. This figure is 
given in the last column of the previous tables. 
5. CURVE OPERATIONS 
The basic elliptic curve operation required in cryptography is point multiplication. That is 
given P • E(Fq) and k •n  [1,. . . ,  #E(Fq)  - 1] compute [k]P. There are various techniques to 
perform this which are described in [6,7]. 
A first observation is that if P is a fixed point which is required to be multiplied by a large 
number of values, k, then one can use a great deal of precomputation, see [7, Algorithm 14.109]. 
Such a point, P, is often the generator of the group #E(Fq),  and is hence, called a base point. 
However, sometimes we do not know the value of P in advance and so different optimisations 
need to be performed, in such a situation we call P a general point. In this case, we used the 
signed window method, see [6, Algorithm IV.7]. 
In standard implementations for the EC-DH protocol, each party needs to perform one mul- 
tiplication of a general point and one multiplication of the fixed base point. In the EC-DSA 
protocol, the signer needs to perform one multiplication of the base point and the verifier needs 
to perform a multiplication of the base point and a multiplication of a general point. 
A second observation is that multiplication, of both a general point and of the base point, 
can be done in either a/fine or 'mixed' coordinates. 'Mixed' coordinates refers to the fact that 
although we may use a projective representation f the points, we take into account hat some of 
the intermediate points may be in affine representation. Mixed coordinates are to be preferred 
when the ratio, r, of inversion to multiplication is large, since one is trading off inversions for a 
larger number of multiplications. On the other hand, affine coordinates require 33% less storage. 
For our timings we used the following curves which are suitably strong for cryptographic use: 
E(K1 ). We used the curve labelled P - 192 by NIST, [12]. This is the curve secp192rl in SECG 
and prime192v1 in ANSI X9.62. This curve is given by 
E1 : y2 : X 3 _ 3X + b, 
where 
b = 2455155546008943817740293915197451784769108058161191238065. 
This curve has group order 
6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081, 
which is a prime. The use of a curve with a coefficient of -3  for the X term in the equation 
provides a certain performance advantage, whilst a curve of prime group order is clearly a security 
advantage. 
E(K2). In this case, we needed to generate our own curve so we took the curve given by 
E2 : y2 _- X 3 _ 3X + 131072z s.
This curve has group order 
98079709408817419107904759865224139567261719261401444244, 
which is four times a prime. Again notice the coefficient of X in the curve equation is minus 
three. 
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E(K.~). In this case, we use the curve in Example 16 [6, p. 187]. This is given by 
E3 : y2  + XY  = X 3 + X 2 + b, 
where 
b = 7BC86E2102902EC4D5890E8B6B4981FF27EO482750FEFC03.  
This curve has group order 
2 x 1569275433846670190958947355834614995815261150867795429199, 
which is two t imes a prime. Here we have chosen a curve with coefficient of X 2 equal to one, 
this gives greater performance in characterist ic two. In addit ion, for character ist ic two fields the 
best type  of group order we can use is one which is twice a prime. Hence, this curve is typical  of 
ones used in real life systems, although NIST does not have a curve in character ist ic two at this 
level of security. 
In Tables 3 and 4, we see that  for OEF  fields we obtain a improvement  when using affine 
coordinates.  We also reduce the amount of memory required for the tables when using only 
affine coordinates in the window mult ipl icat ion methods, since we no longer need to store the 
z-coordinates.  
Table 3. Curve operation timings on the Sparc. 
Operation Montgomery GM-prime OEF F2191 
Addition: Affine 212/~ s 179/~s 40#s 179#s 
Addition: Mixed 114~s 81#s 74~s 168 ]~ s 
Doubling: Affine 212/~s 191#s 48Ds 174~s 
Doubling: Mixed 69~s 48#s 40#s 67~s 
Base Point Mult.: Affine 13 ms 12 ms 3 ms 12 ms 
Base Point Mult.: Mixed 7 ms 5 ms 4 ms 9 ms 
General Point Mult.: Affine 48ms 43ms 10ms 40ms 
General Point Mult.: Mixed 18ms 12ms 10ms 19ms 
Table 4. Curve operation timings on the Pentium. 
Operation Montgomery GM-prime OEF F2191 
Addition: Affine 650#s 635/z s 104#s 490/~s 
Addition: Mixed 234#s 221/~s 179#s 414/~s 
Doubling: Affine 700#s 665/zs 128#s 488/~ s
Doubling: Mixed 146/~s 134/~ s 108/z s 164#s 
Base Point Mult.: Affine 44ms 43ms 7ms 33ms 
Base Point Mult.: Mixed 14ms 14ms 11 ms 23ms 
General Point Mult.: Affine 160 ms 151 ms 28 ms 111 ms 
General Point Mult.: Mixed 37ms 35ms 27ms 46ms 
We also notice that  for general point  mult ipl icat ions the performance of curves over fields of 
even character ist ic s not as bad as one would be led to believe from just  looking at the t imings 
for the field ar i thmetic.  In some small systems, to avoid attacks like DPA [18] one often alters the 
base point  on every run of the protocol. Hence, one never actual ly uses the special opt imisat ions 
for mult ip ly ing a base point  and all point mult ipl icat ions become general ones. 
6. CRYPTOGRAPHIC  OPERATIONS 
Final ly,  we t imed three basic cryptographic operat ions which are popular  using ECC namely  
unsigned Diff ie-Hellman (EC-DH),  the EC variant of the digital  s ignature algor i thm (EC-DSA) ,  
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Table 5. Cryptographic operation times on the Sparc. 
Operation Montgomery GM-prime OEF F2191 
EC-DSA Sign 6ms 4ms 3ms 10ms 
EC-DSA Verify 27 ms 18 ms 12 ms 29 ms 
EC-DH 24ms 15ms 13ms 29ms 
EC-MQV 34 ms 23 ms 19 ms 39 ms 
Table 6. Cryptographic operation times on the Pentium. 
Operation Montgomery GM-prime OEF F21g~ 
EC-DSA 'Sign 16 ms 16 ms 9 ms 22 ms 
EC-DSA Verify 52 ms 49 ms 35 ms 70 ms 
EC-DH 53 ms 50 ms 40 ms 72 ms 
EC-MQV 73 ms 70 ms 50 ms 97 ms 
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and the EC variant of the MQV primitive (EC-MQV). The timings we given in Tables 5 and 6 
for our four specimen fields. The times for EC-DH and EC-MQV are the times required by one 
of the parties to perform their calculations. We assumed that any base point multiplication was 
done using the optimisations alluded to above. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that OEF fields appear to offer performance advantages over other field rep- 
resentations u ed in ECC. This is not only in terms of overall performance but also in terms of 
storage memory requirements. The present author has no vested interests in any of the four field 
types under consideration and hopefully the results can be taken as completely independent of
commercial bias or the use of aggressive optimisation techniques applied to one of the cases only. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the performance difference between OEF fields 
and fields based on generalized Mersenne numbers is probably not large enough to warrant 
additions to the various tandards since addition of OEF fields would degrade attempts to obtain 
interoperability between various implementations. 
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